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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an innovative technology which has reached its threshold for commercial
use. A growing number of research groups and companies around the world implement QKD experiments.
For educational purposes, we present a post-processing software bundle for a QKD experiment carried out
in our research group. The software manages the readout from a time-tagger, sifting, error correction
and privacy amplification of the exchanged key. For error correction, we employ LDPC codes with the
sum-product decoding algorithm, provided by R. Neal. For privacy amplification, Toeplitz matrices are
used. The software code can be found at: https://git.rwth-aachen.de/oleg.nikiforov/qkd-tools
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1 Scope of Technical Report
The scientific exchange is a crucial element of successful research. Besides journal publications and
conference contributions, a direct exchange of know-how and collaborations are important for accelerating
progress in different fields.
Therefore, in this report we present the design and the usage of the software bundle that we implemented
for control and evaluation of our QKD experiment, realizing a polarization based Bennet-Brassard-84
protocol. Within our software bundle, we also incorporated open source libraries already available.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum key distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an important method for secure communication based on the exchange
of symmetric keys between the communicating parties based on the laws of quantum mechanics. Thus, its
security employs the laws of physics with the additional feature that a potential eavesdropper will reveal
itself by errors introduced into the exchanged key. The first protocol was proposed by Bennet and Brassard
in 1984 [1]. Since then, a large number of different protocols have been proposed, implemented and
analyzed. Several reviews and further details of various protocols can be found in the literature [2, 3, 4].
Here, we give solely a brief general description of a generic QKD protocol.
In general, QKD considers two parties, Alice and Bob, who want to communicate privately. Both parties
are connected by a quantum channel for the transmission of quantum objects (the so-called qubits) and a
classical authenticated channel, where Alice and Bob could exchange further information as well as the
encrypted message. Thus, the privacy of the data transmission depends on the applied key and the security
of the key transmission. Quantum theory guarantees an information theoretical secure key exchange over
the quantum channel. This claim arises from the fact that the information is encoded within the state of
single quantum objects (single photons or faint laser pulses). Those states can be described by functions,
elements of a Hilbert space and could be prepared within several different given bases of that space. The
states or rather the possible measurement outcomes within different bases represent classical bits 0 or 1.
The base and the state of every single qubit is chosen randomly by Alice. She prepares the qubit
accordingly and sends it via the quantum channel to Bob. To obtain the correct classical information, a
physical measurement within the matching base must be performed. The ignorance of the correct base
leads to errors in information retrieving, if a wrong base is chosen. Bob chooses randomly a base for each
qubit and notes the chosen base and the value obtained. Once the qubit exchange is finished, Alice and
Bob announce publicly, which base was used for each qubit, so they can discard measurements within
unmatching bases (the so-called key sifting). A potential eavesdropper, generally referred to as Eve, tries to
remain undetected and must keep all her errors. Furthermore, according to quantum theory, she is not
able to generate an exact copy of the state of any qubit and if she performs any measurement on it, in
general, she changes its state, introducing additional errors.
After the key sifting, the remaining bits should be identical in a perfect experiment and with no
eavesdropper present. However, the noisy environment or the presence of Eve affect the qubits during
the exchange, leading to errors in the sifted key. By directly comparing a part of the exchange bits (and
discarding those bits afterwards), Alice and Bob determine this quantum bit error rate (QBER). If this
QBER is below a certain threshold, the key exchange is considered successful [5]. Otherwise, the parties
have to start over. The key sifting finishes the stage of the qubit exchange and both communicating parties
obtain a raw key. For generation of the secure key, classical post-processing procedures have to be carried
out.
2.2 Post-processing in quantum key distribution
In an ideal QKD experiment without an eavesdropper and noise, the raw key is perfectly error free. However,
in any real-world implementation, a large number of errors arises from the imperfections of the setup
(there exist no perfect single photon sources and detectors), or the quantum channel (Brillouin scattering,
polarization mode and chromatic dispersion etc.). During the post-processing procedures the errors
introduced are identified (so-called parameter estimation) and corrected (key reconciliation). Subsequently,
the privacy amplification step is carried out, minimizing the potential eavesdropper’s information about the
key.
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2.2.1 Channel capacity and the achievable secret key rate
A perfectly secure key can be extracted from a sifted key pf the length n, if the mutual information between
Alice and Bob I(A,B) = H(A)−H(A|B) is smaller than the mutual information between Alice and Eve
I(A,E). Here H(X) denotes the Shannon entropy of X and H(X|Y ) denotes the conditional entropy, i.e.
the amount of uncertainty of the variable X, if the variable Y is known. Furthermore, it can be shown
that due to noise, the mutual information of Alice and Bob decreases, that of Alice and Eve increases.
I(A,B) + I(A,E) ≤ n holds for the sum. A perfectly secure key can then be extracted from the sifted key





The quantum channel is assumed to be a symmetrical binary channel, i.e. a channel with possible bit
flips and an equal probability p of each bit to flip from 1 to 0 and vice versa.
The Shannon theorem [6] states a maximum transmission rate of reliable information over a noisy
channel. This quantity is denoted as the capacity of the channel C = 1− h(p), with the Shannon entropy
h(p) for a symmetric binary channel [7]:
h(p) = −p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p). (2)
It quantifies the amount of information about the key that Eve can possess. With the condition for maximal
rate I(A,B) = n ·C = n · (1−h(p)) and equation 1, the critical error rate can be found to be p ≤ 11% [2].
This means that for QBER≤ 11% a secure key can be extracted.
The theoretically possible secure quantum key rate (also denoted as the secret capacity) is given by
the amount of information, unknown to Eve, minus the amount of data needed by Bob to correct the
transmission errors [7]:
Kth = H(A|E)−H(A|B) (3)
For real error correcting algorithms the achievable rates are much lower and depend on the efficiency
of the error-correcting protocol f , which is the ratio of the information, revealed by the implemented
protocol, to an ideal protocol with f = 1. The achievable key rate is given by [7]:
Kreal = H(A|E)− fH(A|B) = 1− h(p)− fh(p) = C − fh(p), (4)
The amount of the information announced during the error correction procedure is given by h(p) for
an ideal error correcting protocol with f = 1. If Nkey denotes the key length, Nparity the length of the













the achievable key rate yields







It is obvious that the secure key is shortened due to two effects. On the one hand, h(p) denotes the






describes the parity data announced publicly due to the error correcting procedure.
For experiments, the final key length is given by:











is due to the finite nature of the exchanged key [8]. This is required for a uniform distribution of the key
and εsec = 2−60 is a typical value.
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2.2.2 Parameter estimation and key reconciliation
For the parameter estimation, Alice and Bob choose a subset of the exchanged qubit, announce and compare
their values and estimate the error correction of the whole key from the error rate in the compared sample.
The used bits are then discarded. Afterwards, the key reconciliation (error correction) is carried out.
There exist several different error correcting algorithms that widely vary in their en- and decoding costs,
communication load and performance: Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) Codes [9], Cascade [10], Turbo
codes [11], Winnow code [12], Polar codes [13]. From all those types of algorithms the LDPC code is the
most promising, enabling encoding extremely close to the Shannon limit [14]. The run-time efficiency can
be decreased by proper programming [15] or by the use of GPUs [16] or FPGAs [17]. Originally proposed
by Gallager [9], it was rediscovered by Neal and McKay [14], who suggested the use of that algorithm for
efficient error correction. Nowadays, LDPC codes are a part of the wireless network standard, are used
in digital television, for optimization of solid state disks etc. Here, a short introduction to classical LDPC
codes is given.
The LDPC codes are elements of the class of linear codes and can be expressed as linear functions with
a sparse matrix. Let m = (m1, . . . ,mn) be a message of n bits. It should be encoded into a code word
c = (c1, . . . , ck) of length k by a generator matrix G of the size n× k:
c = mG (8)
After the encoded message is transmitted over a noisy channel, the presence of errors can be checked by
the parity-check matrix H of the size (k − n)× k. H is chosen such that:
GHT = 0 (9)
And the correctness is checked by:
cHT = mGHT = m0 = 0 (10)
Alice sends the message c to Bob and he receives the message c′ ̸= c containing errors. He then starts the
decoding of the message, reconstructing c. Finding an efficient decode algorithm is non trivial and is still a
research topic. The most widely used algorithm is the belief propagation, a subclass of the sum-product
algorithms. A good description of the algorithm is given in [18].
Both parties agree on the generator and parity check matrices before the error correction procedure.
2.2.3 Privacy amplification
The privacy amplification creates from the error corrected key of bit length n partially known to a potential
eavesdropper Eve, a key of bit length l entirely unknown to Eve. Typically, two-universal hash functions
are used for that purpose. A two-universal hash function is a function f : U → V with the property for all
x, y ∈ U :
P (f(x) = f(y)) ≤ 1|V | , (11)
i.e. the collision probability is kept as low as possible. In general, even tiny mismatches in the error corrected
keys of the communicating parties, lead to a completely different key after the privacy amplification. R.
Renner showed that a randomly picked two-hash function can create a secure key [3].
In our implementation, for privacy amplification we use the multiplication with a Toeplitz matrix [19],
a l × n matrix of the form:
M =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝







b0 · · · bn−1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (12)
The Toeplitz matrix is defined by a sequence bk of the length of (l + n− 1) bits. The secret key length l is
given by equation 7.
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3 General description of the system
3.1 Hardware for signal acquisition
We implemented a polarization-based BB84 protocol without decoy states and with a passive basis
choice [20, 21]. The raw key rates obtained over roughly a meter free space transmission are around
several kilobits per second and the error rate amounts to 8 . . . 10%.
The Bob module has four single photon detectors connected to an Altera Cyclone FPGA board for data
acquisition. The key sifting is carried out at the FPGA board and communicated to Alice by an additional
classical channel implemented by a pulsed laser. The sifted key data is accumulated at the FPGA board,
divided into blocks of 100 bits length and are transmitted over the USB 2.0 channel to a personal computer.
Alice and Bob signal the beginning of each block over the sifting channel, in order to ensure s synchronous
operation and error free transmission of packets from the FPGA to the PC. The Ez-USB driver for that
interface is provided by the manufacturer. The data acquisition system on the FPGA is based on the open
source solution of S. Polyakov [22] and is not the scope of the present report. For further details, please





















Figure 1: Scheme of the classical data management of the QKD experiment.
Our software system for post-processing is implemented for the Windows operating system, since it
requires some proprietary libraries for the communication per USB-2.0 channel with our data acquisition
system.
The key post-processing system operates parallel within several threads. There are threads for FPGA
data readout, for post-processing as well as for output to a file. Thus, the run time of the algorithms are
decreased for multi-core CPUs.
Fig. 1 shows an overview of the complete classical key management in our experiment: data acquisition,
post-processing and secure key output. For each step the key data packets are taken from some queue,
processed and added to the next queue. The regular processing line includes four queues:
1. Sifted Key Queue: Here, the sifted key packets from FPGA are lined up.
2. Valid Sifted Key Queue: After discarding of the invalid packets the remaining key data is stored.
3. Error Corrected Key Queue: The packets after the successful error correction are added.
4. Privacy amplified Key Queue: The packets after the successful privacy amplification are added.
The irregular processing line contains the Debug Key Queue for debugging purposes. Here the packets
are put out without error correction and privacy amplification.
The exchanged sifted key can still contain some errors and invalid key blocks. During post-processing
the following three steps are carried out in our post-processing routine:
1. Filtering of invalid sifted key packets
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2. Parameter estimation and error correction
3. Privacy amplification
Each of those steps is executed in its own thread. In the following, we will discuss each step in more detail.
3.3 Filtering of the invalid key packets
In the first post-processing step, Alice and Bob check the validity of their sifted key blocks. Therefore, they
control the number of the sifted key bits in each block received from the FPGA. A valid block contains
exactly 100 bits. The communicating parties announce the results over the public network channel. The
invalid blocks are then discarded by both of the parties. The synchronization of evaluation is ensured,
by the simultaneous start of data acquisition with empty key queues. Additionally, the synchronization
signals over the key sifting channel flag the begin of each block for both of the parties. Furthermore, the
processing starts only after the network communication is finished. In this way, Alice and Bob start to
process the matching key packets simultaneously, even if they possess unequal computing power.
3.4 Parameter estimation and key reconciliation
A bit error rate of the quantum bits (QBER) is an important measure for the security of exchanged data, as
it enables the estimation of the information that a potential eavesdropper may have collected. Thus, QBER
is a parameter for the privacy amplification.
During the parameter estimation step the QBER is determined. Therefore, Alice combines 110 key
packets (each containing 100 bits) and chooses randomly from those 11,000 bits a subset of the length
1,000. She announces the coordinates and the value of the bits from that sample over the public channel
and eliminates subsequently that subset from her key.
Bob also combines 110 key packets and compares the values received from Alice to the values that he
had measured and estimates the QBER. Then, he also discards the publicly known fraction of data from
his key and announces the QBER to Alice.
The QBER estimation is carried out as follows. For example, let p = 9% be the maximal allowed error
probability. Then, the cumulative binomial distribution Pn,p(X ≤ k) describes the probability for up to k
bits to be erroneous in a sample of n bits. For example, P1000,0.09(x ≤ 74) ≈ 0.04. This means that the
probability for the real QBER to be smaller than 9% amounts to 95%, if the maximal number of error bits
is 74. All the blocks with a sample exceeding this threshold are thus discarded.
Because of samples for QBER estimation nine percent of the exchanged key length is used up. This
number is a compromise in a trade-off between the precision of the QBER estimation and the amount of
qubits used.
The non-discarded blocks, consisting now of 10,000 bits, are divided into 10 new blocks for the error
correction procedure. In principle, it is possible to vary the block size. However, for smaller blocks the
network latency leads to slower progress and the bigger blocks are detrimental for secure key length, if
the QBER lies between 8.5 and 10% (see sec. 4)
Thus, after the parameter estimation Alice and Bob possess key packets of the size of 1,000 bits. For the
error correction via LDPC codes we adapted the open source library ldpclib provided by Radford Neal [24].
Here, the belief propagation algorithm [14] is used in that implementation. The beginning of the algorithm,
the error probability for each exchanged bit is set. Subsequently, the algorithm is carried out iteratively,
until the correct code word is found or the maximal number of iterations is reached.
In our implementation, the error probability for parity bits is set to 0, since the parity bits are transmitted
over the classical channel assumed to be noise-free. This is our only modification of the code by R. Neal.
The performance of the algorithm depends on the matrices used. However, the construction of appropriate
parity-check matrices is non-trivial. In our case, generator and parity-check matrices are generated within
ldpclib [24].
The success of the decoding algorithm is determined by the process described in 2.2.2: parity-check
matrix checks the validity of the code word. If the code word is valid, no further verification of the key
packet is necessary.
In the case of an invalid code word, the decoding failed and the key still contains errors. During the
privacy amplification, the error rate would increase leading to a useless key. Thus, Bob informs Alice about
the failed algorithm and both parties discard the present key packet.
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3.5 Privacy amplification
According to equation 7, the security parameter during the privacy amplification is independent of the key
packet size. For a 1,000 bit packet length, the security key length would amount to zero bits. Therefore, for
the privacy amplification 10 key packets of length 1,000 are combined and processed simultaneously. For
the estimated QBER≤ 9% and for the ratio of the parity data length to the key length ofNparity/Nkey = 0.522
(see sec. 4) the final secret key length amounts to l = 295 bits.
4 Optimization of the matrix size
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Figure 2: Simulated effective key rate Keff as a function of the parity bit length.
For efficient error correction, a suitable LDPC matrix is necessary. Thus, the number of the parity bits to
be transmitted is a crucial parameter. There exists a trade-off between the shortening of the key length
due to public announcement of the parity bits and the increasing failure probability of the error correcting
algorithm due to the lack of parity bits also resulting in discarded key packets. This leads to the expression
for the effective key rate Keff:










Hereby, Kreal is the real key rate given in 6 and BLER denotes the block error rate, i.e. the number of
blocks to be discarded due to a failed error correction. To maximize our Keff, we test the implemented
post-processing software for different parity bit lengths and evaluate the effective key rate Keff. For this
simulation, we created 5,000 of random 1,000 bit long key blocks with the error rate of 8%. For each
parity bit length between 400 and 800 the error correction procedure was then carried out. Afterwards,
the number of the unsuccessfully error corrected blocks was calculated and Keff was determined. The
result is shown in fig. 2. The effective key rate turned out to be non-vanishing for the parity bit length
between 400 and 600 and reaches its maximum around 525± 5 bits.
The maximal possible key rate depends also on the QBER. In the second step, we repeated the previous
simulation for the keys with the QBER between 5% and 11%. The result is shown in fig. 3. The effective
key rate drops to zero for the QBER of 10 . . . 11% for all chosen parity bit lengths, i.e. the chosen algorithm
is unsuitable for data with a high QBER. However, since roughly a QBER of 11% constitutes the limit for
secure key exchange this is not a problem.
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Figure 3: Simulated effective key rate Keff as a function of the parity bit length and QBER of the
key.
Fig. 3 suggests also the dependence of the optimal parity bit length on the present QBER. To specify it,
we consider for our experiment the relevant QBER area between 7% and 10%. The results are shown in
fig. 4). Here, for better clarity, the data points are connected by cubic hermite spline and the curve colors
indicate different QBER. The dotted line denotes the optimal parity bit length. It turns out that the optimal
parity bit length only slightly varies around l = 521.6 bits. Therefore, we determine the optimal parity bit
length for our experiment to be 522 bits.
In the end, we consider the influence of the key block length on the performance of our error correction
algorithm. Therefore, the key block length is set subsequently to 100, 1,000, 10,000 and 20,000 bit
followed by a run the error correction procedure. To minimize the variance for the result, the number of
the tested blocks are also different. For key block lengths of 100 and 1,000 an amount of 10,000 blocks was
used, and for the lengths of 10,000 and 20,000 the amount of 1,000 blocks was sufficient. The parity bit
length ratio is set to Nparity/Nkey = 0.52 as determined above. In the fig. 5 the dependence of the number
of unsuccessfully error corrected blocks versus the QBER in those blocks is shown. For clarity, the dots are
connected by the cubic Hermite splines and the total number of the data points is reduced. From the data
can be concluded that a higher key block length is only advantageous for QBER below 8.5%. Since the
expected QBER in our experiment lies above that value, we chose a smaller key packet length. Additionally,
for a QBER> 8.5% long blocks lead to a rapid increase of the BLER.
5 Evaluation of the complete software system
After implementing our software, we conducted a thorough test with following parameters. The error
bit threshold for acceptance of the sifted key blocks with the size of 1,000 bits was set to 74 bits. That
corresponds to a QBER≤ 9%. The key block length for the error correction is set to 1,000 bits and the
parity bit length was set to 522. In this way, after the privacy amplification with blocks of 10,000 bits
length, we obtained the final key length of 295 bits corresponding to the expected real key length given in
equation 7. For those parameters, the parity-check, the generator, and the Toeplitz matrices were created
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Figure 4: Simulated effective key rate Keff as a function of the parity bit length. Color denotes
different QBERs. The dotted line indicates the approximate maxima of the curves.
and the test conducted
For the test, we simulated several sets of the sifted keys with the QBER between 5% and 10% with the
size of 107 bits per set. Subsequently, we applied our post-processing routine on those keys and obtained
the actual secret key length, displayed in fig. 6. The data points are connected by cubic hermite splines.
The data shows that the effective key rate vanishes for a QBER higher than 9%. For QBER below 6.5% the
effective key rate approaches asymptotically a rate of 0.0268.
Here, the obtained actual rate Kact is smaller than Kreal as well as Keff due to several reasons. In each
step of the error correction, the key is shortened:
• During the parameter estimation, 10% of the key length was consumed in order to estimate the
QBER.
• During the key reconciliation a high number of packets was discarded, since the number of error bits
exceeded 74 out of 1000. In fact, for a QBER= 9% the algorithm discards around 95% of all packets.
And for a QBER= 5% only 0.04%.
• Due to a failed error correcting algorithm a lot of packets are discarded (compare fig. 5).
• Privacy amplification algorithms compress the key (see sec. 2.2.1).
According to the results of the test, the secure key rate drops rapidly for QBER exceeding 6.5%. For
experiments with smaller QBER it would be recommended to increase the block length for error correction
according to fig. 5 and to the number of discarded packets during the parameter estimation.
6 Implemented Software
In this section, technical details on the structure of our implementation are given. The source code of our
software can be found at: https://git.rwth-aachen.de/oleg.nikiforov/qkd-tools.
The class-diagram of the implemented library is displayed in fig. 7. The main class is the quantum
key distribution manager (QkdMgr) which takes care of all necessary steps for the successful secret key
creation. The device manager (DevMgr) is responsible for the data acquisition with the FPGA board and
the network manager (NetworkMgr) establishes a connection to the communicating partner. The thread
manager (ThreadMgr) is responsible for the error correction within the ldpcMgr-class and the privacy
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Figure 5: Block error rate BLER as a function of the QBER.
amplification within the PrivAmp-class. Finally, the class printOutKey enables the output of the key to
a file.
6.1 Data structure
An efficient handling of the sifted keys requires a dedicated data structure. Therefore, a qubit stream
detected and sifted at the FPGA is divided into packets (objects of class KeyQueuePacket) which are
added to a queue (class KeyQueue) and subsequently processed (Fig. 8).
The attributes of the KeyQueuePacket are described in table 1. During the initialization of the
KeyQueuePacket-Object, the validity-attribute should be set.
Attribute Description
data pointer to the key data bits
len length of the key in the packet
qber packet’s error rate
sentParBits number of the parity bits, sent for error correction
next pointer to the next packet in the queue
Table 1: Attributes of the KeyQueuePacket-object.
6.2 QKD manager
First of all, the QKD manager has to be configured by the command readConfigFromFile(.). The
configuration file must match the rules in tab. 2.
Next, the key generating process can be controlled by start(), stop() and reset(). The command
close() shuts the connection to the FPGA and closes the secret key output file.
For simple access QkdMgr provides an automatic mode which can be activated by a parameter in the
configuration file (Tab.2). In this mode, Alice’s QkdMgr opens a network connection to Bob’s QkdMgr


















Figure 6: Simulated actual key rate Kact as a function of QBER.
The command startDebug() offers an alternative operation mode for debugging. Instead of the error
correction and privacy amplification, here the packets are checked for validity, the QBER of the valid
packets is determined and the raw key is written to a file.
6.3 Device manager
The communication with the FPGA board is carried out by the Device Manager (class DevMgr). It encapsu-
lates the library fpgaIO.dll (see sec. 6.4), provides all its functions and offers some additional functionality,
such as the data acquisition in a separated thread. First, the command setQueue() creates a queue for
the sifted key packets. Subsequently, openDev() and setDelayandStart() opens a connection to the
FPGA board, configures the delays and starts the data acquisition on the FPGA board. Then, the command
startDataCollectThread() starts a new thread for data reception which collects new data with a
repetitive call of getData(), divides them into packets and puts them into a queue.
The incoming data are divided into blocks of 100 bits at the FPGA. For detection of USB transmission
errors, after receiving the number of the sifted key bits in each block is calculated. (A valid block consists
of exactly 100 bits.) Subsequently, the bits are put into a new instance of KeyQueuePacket created
with an according attribute isValid and then put into the queue. Both, valid and invalid packets are
parts of the sifted key. By the command stop() the signal acquisition at the FPGA board is stopped,
stopDataCollectingThread() finishes the thread for data transition from the FPGA board to the PC.
The command clearDeviceDataStorage() wipes the FPGA cache and closeDev() shuts the USB
connections to the FPGA board.
6.4 FPGA control
The library fpgaIO.dll enables the control of the FPGA board. It is based on the functions implemented in
the open source project by S. Polyakov [22]. Therefore, the following commands are implemented:
• FPGA_Open() opens the connection to the FPGA and returns a handle.


























+setNetworkData(connectToIP: char*, Port1: int, Port2: int, Port3: int)
+setPAKeyLength(paKeyLen: int)















+sendData(data: char*, len: int&): bool
+receiveData(data: char*, len: int&): bool
+receiveDataOfLen(data: char*, len: int): bool
+sendDataInPackets(data: char*, len: int, retVal: char&)

















+decodeParityAndData(parity: char*, data: char*): bool
+getDecodedData(): char*
+getCodewordLength(): int
Figure 7: Class diagram of the qkdtools.dll library
• FPGA_Interface(.) communicates with the FPGA board.
Each call transmits a command to FPGA of length one byte. The commands in Table 3 define the delay
times and trigger the begin or the end of data acquisition at the FPGA.
For setting up the delay time, all six bytes are required. The first four bytes define the relative delay of
SPADs. And the last two bytes define the global delay: the penultimate byte sets seven lower bits and the
ultimate byte the 5 higher bits of the global delay, that is 12 bits long.
The global delay should be carefully adjusted. Therefore, the class qkdtools (not shown in the class
diagram) provides the command optimizeGlobalDelay(.). This function requires all relative delays
and an estimated global delay as parameter. The function then varies the global delay within ±5 clock
cycles around the received estimated value and returns the exact value of the global delay which maximizes













Figure 8: Class diagram of the data structure
Line number Content
1 comment/header
2 auto mode (on:1, out:0)
3 identity (Alice:1, Bob:0)
4-7 relative delay of the four detectors in terms of the clock periods
(a number between 0 and 127)
8 global delay in terms of the clock periods (a number between 0 and 4095)
9 IP-address of the opposite communication partner (XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX)
10-13 four open communication ports (e.g. from 12396 to 12399)
14 final length of the secure key, -1 for a dynamic calculation
15 maximal number of the error bits allowed from 1000 investigated bits.
16 filename of the LDPC parity-check matrix (*.pchk)
17 filename of the LDPC generator matrix (*.gen)
18 key output filename
Table 2: Configuration file rules for the QKD manager object.
6.5 Network manager
The class NetworkMgr is capable of communicating over the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). Prior to
data transmission and after the configuration via setNetworkParam(.) a network connection between
the communicating partners should be established. Therefore, one of the partners, working as a server,
opens a port and accepts incoming connections via bindSocket(). The opposite partner, the client,
connects to the server’s open port by connectSocket(). After the connection has been established, the
communication becomes symmetric: both, Alice and Bob are able to send (sendData(.)) and receive
data (receiveData(.)). Hereby, a large amount of data is divided into smaller packets by the protocol.
The command receiveDataOfLen(.) waits until a certain amount of data is received.
In the case the data exceeds 1,500 bytes, it must be divided into packets, transmitted and subsequently
restored from all smaller packets by sendDataInPackets(.) and receiveDataInPackets(.). The
command closeSocket() shuts the connection.
6.6 Key output
The class printOutKey consumes the key packets from some queue and puts it out in a text file. Therefore,
a new thread is started and stopped by startPrintOut() and stopPrintOut() respectively. The
command closeFile() closes the key output file.
6.7 Thread manager for post-processing
The exchanged sifted key still contains some errors and invalid key blocks. During post-processing the
errors are discarded and the secret key is established. Three steps are included in our post-processing
routine:
1. Filtering of invalid sifted key packets
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10000110 set a delay (The 7th bit defines the command,
other bits define the value of the delay. Here: 6)
2. Parameter estimation and key reconciliation
3. Privacy amplification
Each of those steps is carried out in its own thread. For each step the key packets are taken out of a queue,
processed and lined up into the next queue, according to fig. 1. Therefore, the threads are organized by
the Thread Manager (class ThreadMgr). The initialization of the thread manager requires the following
steps. Its IP address and open ports are configured by setNetworkData(.). By setActAsAlice(.)
the role of the communicating party is defined. The command setLDPCMatFiles(.) defines the path to
the matrices for error correction algorithm. And the command setPAKeyLength(.) the final key length
is set (value -1 denotes the automatic calculation of the size). The command setMaxBitErrors(.)
defines the number of error bits for a sample of 1000 bits, the threshold for discarding of the key block.
Finally, the Sifted Key Queue (by setKeyQueue(.)) and the final Privacy Amplified Key Queue (by
setFinalKeyQueue(.)) are created.
After the configuration the three threads can be managed by startThread(.) and stopThread(.).
Those functions require the thread ID as a parameter: 0, 1 or 2 for the regular threads and 3 for the
debugging thread.
The queues are cleared by clearAllQueues() or clearInternalQueues(), after the threads are
stopped. The first command clears all of the queues, but the latter one keeps the sifted key queue and the
privacy amplified key queue untouched.
6.7.1 LDPC Manager
The class ldpcMgr provides the interface for the library ldpclib. Its instantiation requires a filename with
the corresponding control (∗.pchk) and generator (∗.gen) matrices. The size of those matrices determines
the size of the key to be corrected and the amount of the required parity bits.
Error correction is carried out within the following steps: Alice encodes a data block by encode(.)
and receives a pointer to the parity data by getParityData(). She transmits the parity data over
the public channel to Bob. For the decoding of the data, Bob sets an estimated error probability for the
key data by setErrorProbabilityForDec(.) and the maximal number of algorithm iterations by
setMaxNrOfIterations(.). Subsequently, he combines his measured key data with the received
parity data and starts decoding by decodeParityAndData(.). A successful decoding returns a true.
Thus, the command getDecodedData() returns a pointer to the now error-free key bits. Subsequently,
Bob informs Alice about his success and both parties put the key packet into the next queue.
6.7.2 Privacy amplification
The class PrivAmp enables the privacy amplification procedure. First of all, the final key length must be
set by setPAKeyLength(.). This parameter is either constant or can be varied for each packet as a
function of the QBER and the number of the transmitted parity bits (see sec. 2.2).
Thus, Alice takes 10 error corrected key packets from the queue, calculates the final key length and
creates a random Toeplitz matrix by generateToeplitzMat() and receives access to its pointer by
getToeplitzMat(). Then she transmits this matrix to Bob over the public channel.
Bob receives the matrix and passes it by setToeplitzMat(.) to his PrivAmp-Instance. Analogously
to Alice, he picks 10 key packets out of the queue and both parties calculate the final key by calcPAKey(.).
The command copyPAKey(.) allows for the transmission of the final key to the key packet that is then
put into the output key queue.
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7 Conclusion
In this technical report, we present the implementation of the post-processing software for our BB84
quantum key distribution experiment. We discuss the optimal parameters to be used for different observed
quantum key error rates in order to maximize the final secret key rate.
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